HardenedLinux

We are "patient" zero, so we hardened ourselves!

Jul 31, 2017 - 2 minute read - Research

Firmware auditing with CHIPSEC

Install the prerequisite packages: Or if you are using PaX/Grsecurity 4.9.x: Install the CHIPSEC Firmware security checklist based on CHIPSEC According to the firmware security training from McAfee Advanced Threat Research. CHIPSEC modules perform a couple checks for the auditing purposes: Issue CHIPSEC Module References SMRAM Locking common.smm CanSecWest 2006 BIOS Keyboard Buffer Sanitization common.bios_kbrd_buffer DEFCON 16 SMRR Configuration common.smrr ITL 2009, CanSecWest 2009 BIOS Protection common.bios_wp BlackHat USA 2009, CanSecWest 2013, Black Hat 2013, NoSuchCon 2013 SPI Controller Locking common.

May 26, 2017 - 2 minute read - Story

Security Promotion - Mandatory TLS Connection for XMPP

Security Promotion: Mandatory TLS Connection for XMPP Although, according to RFC7590 “Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)”, TLS was recommended for XMPP connection. But it is not mandatory. Despite the consensus to switch XMPP on mandatory encryption reached by XMPP communities on 2014, there are still some XMPP service providers support non-encrypted connection as a fallback along with TLS. This will probably lead to some security risks.

Apr 29, 2017 - 5 minute read - Story

HardenedLinux: The way to the Ark

HardenedLinux: The way to the Ark PaX/Grsecurity no longer provides the public access to test patch in Apr 26 2017. In the FAQ of the announcement, PaX team and Spender listed a couple of reasons why they do this. As some people already know, it’s not the whole story. As the result of a discussion inside h4rdenedzer0, we believe that Linux foundation is the culprit behind all this result that the commercial/individual/community users losing access to the test patches.

Mar 17, 2017 - 4 minute read - Research

Mission impossible: Hardening the x86 based core infrastructures

By citypw Mission impossible: Hardening the x86 based core infrastructures “Once upon a time, hackers lives in a world with full of libre/free software/firmware/hardware”…oh, wait, it’s not happened yet. Not sure if we can make it happen. It’s totally depends on the decision we make today. Some people might think we are already lost our freedom on x86. Because there are a bunch of shitty binary blobs during the boot/runtime( Who’s gonna watching the watchers?

Dec 13, 2016 - 12 minute read - Research

Linux kernel mitigation checklist

By citypw PaX/Grsecurity –> KSPP –> AOSP kernel: Linux kernel mitigation checklist( Sep 18 2017) We should treat security as a whole, just like the combination of PaX/Grsecurity features/code hardening build up a defense-in-depth solution for Linux kernel, which is a core infrastructre we are highly rely on. PaX/Grsecurity is a set of security hardening specific patch that brings the linux kernel security into another level. It’s a great value to make all FLOSS community getting benefit from it.

Nov 17, 2016 - 10 minute read - Research

Neutralize ME firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge platforms

Author: persmule Mail: [email protected] 00 ME: Management Engine First introduced in Intel’s 965 Express Chipset Family, the Intel Management Engine (ME) is a separate computing environment physically located in the (G)MCH chip (for Core 2 family CPUs which is separate from the northbridge), or PCH chip replacing ICH(for Core i3/i5/i7 which is integrated with northbridge). The ME consists of an individual processor core, code and data caches, a timer, and a secure internal bus to which additional devices are connected, including a cryptography engine, internal ROM and RAM, memory controllers, and a direct memory access (DMA) engine to access the host operating system’s memory as well as to reserve a region of protected external memory to supplement the ME’s limited internal RAM.