Security Promotion: Mandatory TLS Connection for XMPP Although, according to RFC7590 “Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)”, TLS was recommended for XMPP connection. But it is not mandatory. Despite the consensus to switch XMPP on mandatory encryption reached by XMPP communities on 2014, there are still some XMPP service providers support non-encrypted connection as a fallback along with TLS. This will probably lead to some security risks.

HardenedLinux: The way to the Ark PaX/Grsecurity no longer provides the public access to test patch in Apr 26 2017. In the FAQ of the announcement, PaX team and Spender listed a couple of reasons why they do this. As some people already know, it’s not the whole story. As the result of a discussion inside h4rdenedzer0, we believe that Linux foundation is the culprit behind all this result that the commercial/individual/community users losing access to the test patches.

By citypw Mission impossible: Hardening the x86 based core infrastructures “Once upon a time, hackers lives in a world with full of libre/free software/firmware/hardware”…oh, wait, it’s not happened yet. Not sure if we can make it happen. It’s totally depends on the decision we make today. Some people might think we are already lost our freedom on x86. Because there are a bunch of shitty binary blobs during the boot/runtime( Who’s gonna watching the watchers?

By citypw PaX/Grsecurity –> KSPP –> AOSP kernel: Linux kernel mitigation checklist( Sep 18 2017) We should treat security as a whole, just like the combination of PaX/Grsecurity features/code hardening build up a defense-in-depth solution for Linux kernel, which is a core infrastructre we are highly rely on. PaX/Grsecurity is a set of security hardening specific patch that brings the linux kernel security into another level. It’s a great value to make all FLOSS community getting benefit from it.

Author: persmule Mail: [email protected] 00 ME: Management Engine First introduced in Intel’s 965 Express Chipset Family, the Intel Management Engine (ME) is a separate computing environment physically located in the (G)MCH chip (for Core 2 family CPUs which is separate from the northbridge), or PCH chip replacing ICH(for Core i3/i5/i7 which is integrated with northbridge). The ME consists of an individual processor core, code and data caches, a timer, and a secure internal bus to which additional devices are connected, including a cryptography engine, internal ROM and RAM, memory controllers, and a direct memory access (DMA) engine to access the host operating system’s memory as well as to reserve a region of protected external memory to supplement the ME’s limited internal RAM.

Build debug environment for the dynamic linker of Glibc @(Toolchains)[Glibc|dynamic-linker|gdb|gcc] 00 Prologue Recently my work need some research about the dynamic linker of Glibc, when I use gdb from the PLT table of executable or shared library into the Glibc source in a general way will see this: [...] |0xf7ff04b3 mov 0x10(%esp),%edx | >|0xf7ff04b7 mov 0xc(%esp),%eax | |0xf7ff04bb call 0xf7fea080 [...] (gdb) si [...] 0x0804852b in stub@plt () 0x08048500 in ?