We are "patient" zero, so we hardened ourselves!

Mar 17, 2017 - 4 minute read - Research

Mission impossible: Hardening the x86 based core infrastructures

By citypw Mission impossible: Hardening the x86 based core infrastructures “Once upon a time, hackers lives in a world with full of libre/free software/firmware/hardware”…oh, wait, it’s not happened yet. Not sure if we can make it happen. It’s totally depends on the decision we make today. Some people might think we are already lost our freedom on x86. Because there are a bunch of shitty binary blobs during the boot/runtime( Who’s gonna watching the watchers?

Dec 13, 2016 - 12 minute read - Research

Linux kernel mitigation checklist

By citypw PaX/Grsecurity –> KSPP –> AOSP kernel: Linux kernel mitigation checklist( Sep 18 2017) We should treat security as a whole, just like the combination of PaX/Grsecurity features/code hardening build up a defense-in-depth solution for Linux kernel, which is a core infrastructre we are highly rely on. PaX/Grsecurity is a set of security hardening specific patch that brings the linux kernel security into another level. It’s a great value to make all FLOSS community getting benefit from it.

Nov 17, 2016 - 10 minute read - Research

Neutralize ME firmware on SandyBridge and IvyBridge platforms

Author: persmule Mail: [email protected] 00 ME: Management Engine First introduced in Intel’s 965 Express Chipset Family, the Intel Management Engine (ME) is a separate computing environment physically located in the (G)MCH chip (for Core 2 family CPUs which is separate from the northbridge), or PCH chip replacing ICH(for Core i3/i5/i7 which is integrated with northbridge). The ME consists of an individual processor core, code and data caches, a timer, and a secure internal bus to which additional devices are connected, including a cryptography engine, internal ROM and RAM, memory controllers, and a direct memory access (DMA) engine to access the host operating system’s memory as well as to reserve a region of protected external memory to supplement the ME’s limited internal RAM.

Aug 25, 2016 - 5 minute read - Guide

Build debug environment for the dynamic linker of Glibc

Build debug environment for the dynamic linker of Glibc @(Toolchains)[Glibc|dynamic-linker|gdb|gcc] 00 Prologue Recently my work need some research about the dynamic linker of Glibc, when I use gdb from the PLT table of executable or shared library into the Glibc source in a general way will see this: [...] |0xf7ff04b3 mov 0x10(%esp),%edx | >|0xf7ff04b7 mov 0xc(%esp),%eax | |0xf7ff04bb call 0xf7fea080 [...] (gdb) si [...] 0x0804852b in stub@plt () 0x08048500 in ?

Aug 1, 2016 - 1 minute read - Story

Announcement: HardenedLinux has nothing to do with any commercial organization

Announcement HardenedLinux is a FLOSS community focus only FLOSS security and we have nothing to do with any commcercial organizations. h4rdenedzer0 team and other contributors have their own day job and we’ve been contributing to HardenedLinux in our night job time. We encourage commcercial organizations contribute FLOSS projects. h4rdenedzer0 is the credit for those long-term contributor. Anyone who has not any activities in HardenedLinux community or other FLOSS security project more than 6 months, will be treated as quit h4rdenedzer0 team automatically.

Aug 1, 2016 - 4 minute read - Guide

Reproducible builds for PaX/Grsecurity

Reproducible builds for PaX/Grsecurity A series of scripts are created to do reproducible builds for Linux kernel with PaX/Grsecurity patch set. Thanks to: PaX/Grsecurity Mempo project Debian GNU/Linux Community Shawn C[a.k.a “Citypw”] Linux From Scratch Without the contributions of the projects, community and people, the scripts cannot be accomplished. The project’s GitHub repo is at https://github.com/hardenedlinux/grsecurity-reproducible-build . Why do reproducible builds? Reproducible builds are important to the binary’s reliability. With reproducible builds, anyone can recreate the binary, so it can be proved that the source code provided is really the source code used to build the binary, and no more backdoors (either manually inserted into the code or inserted by hijacked toolchain) is contained in the binary.